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Abstract
The paper discusses two interrelated themes. From 1530 to 1798, the Order of St John, an 
international institution of the Church, played a significant role from its conventual base on 
central Mediterranean Malta—one that nourished a strong element of historical continuity 
within the wider context of a declining Mediterranean. This it did through its traditional 
twofold raison d’être—as a religious, charitable and Hospitaller Order with great expertise 
in medical knowledge and practice, and as a military institution whose traditional crusad‐
ing zeal against Islam kept the ‘clash of civilisations’ alive. That is the first theme. The second 
theme concerns the concept of a declining Ottoman Empire and a declining Mediterranean. 
The paper argues against the idea that the collective impact of the great siege of Malta (1565) 
and the battle of Lepanto (1571) had marked the initial stage in the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire. It also claims that the decline of the sixteenth‐century Mediterranean needs revis‐
iting. It was only a partial change for the worse. The great geographical discoveries suc‐
ceeded in robbing the Middle Sea of its primacy in international economy and exchange but 
in the long term failed to uproot most of its other characteristic features.
Keywords: Order of St. John, Hospitallers, Ottoman Empire, Mediterranean, North Africa, 
Christendom, Islam, hospitality, crusade, great siege of malta, battle of Lepanto, change, 
continuity, decline
1. Preamble
History is exploration, reconstruction and interpretation. It is a means ‘to explain and under‐
stand’, pointed out Fernand Braudel, the finest twentieth‐century historian, in 19841, and 
1Come possiamo proprio noi… erigerci a giudici del passato?’. See Ref. [1].
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should not be turned into ‘an instrument’ to pass judgement on our ancestors, their ideas, 
motives and beliefs, their methods, their frailties, lifestyle, strengths and weaknesses, their 
failures and achievements. It is within this conceptual context that the present paper seeks to 
address the multiple function the Hospitaller Order of St John, an international, supranational 
and supra‐diocesan organisation [2, 3], played as a dynamic force of continuity in the early 
modern Mediterranean. The chapter will also briefly revisit the conventional assumptions 
about the latter’s decline.
2. The Hospitaller institution
From its modest inception in eleventh‐century Jerusalem, the Order of the Hospital, as it came 
to be known, the only one of its kind in the Mediterranean,2 began gradually to assume its four 
predominant roles, each evoking an alluring image of the Knight Hospitaller—the kneeling 
monk absorbed in silent prayer, the humble servant attending to his Lords the sick and the 
poor, the brave and experienced soldier on the battlefield fighting for the faith, and the efficient 
feudal seigneur, though at times admittedly arrogant and disdainful. It was precisely the inte‐
grated performance of all these various, intimately related roles that determined the character 
and function of the Hospitaller in society. He was ‘a constructive factor in European civilisa‐
tion’ [4], one that turned his Order into a living force in the Mediterranean over the subsequent 
700 years until the French Revolution evicted it from central Mediterranean Malta in 1798.
Elizabeth Schermerhorn, writing in 1940, asked: ‘How did [the Order] manage to persist and 
endure among the ruins of feudalism down to the very eve of the [French] revolution?’ [4; 
pp. 11–12]. In her endeavour to explain this ‘endurance’, she identified a number of deter‐
mining ‘elements’ [4, p. 12]. Of these, the one that had perhaps lain at the root of its ‘heri‐
tage’ was its massive landownership. The extensive estates it had gradually acquired through 
donation, purchase, inheritance and absorption spread all over Europe and consisted of all 
sizes, shapes, forms, architectural styles and purposes, each betraying the geography and 
culture of its place of origin. The Order’s intelligent management and efficient administration 
of these lands, their cultivation, in ways like ‘farming and stock‐raising’ and various other 
forms, the meticulous statutory measures rigidly governing their regular maintenance and 
others as stringently observed against any form of alienation—exposed in a relentless way the 
Hospitaller institution’s contribution to ‘the development of the feudal manor’ [3; p. 276, 4–6].
These lands, organised into commanderies, the Order’s basic units of administration, gave the 
institution wealth and power. Each constituted a secure source of regular revenue, a centre to 
recruit and train new brethren [2; p. 340], and a means of social connectivity, of maintaining 
contact with the common peoples of Europe. They financed all its activities in the Holy Land, 
on Rhodes and on Malta, in Europe and throughout the Mediterranean. They sustained its 
crusading ideals and traditions. They were also important ‘as retirement homes [and] resi‐
dences for the Order’s many priests’ [2, p. 340]. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Order 
2Only the [Order of the] Hospital,’ writes Anthony Luttrell, ‘could claim that it underwent no essential change between 
1312 and 1798’ [2, p. 361].
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owned 564 commanderies. Through them the Order survived in its original privileged status 
until the enlightened thought of égalité was put permanently into rude practice. The ancien 
régime finally succumbed to the rise of the unprivileged, dragging with it the Hospitaller 
institution of pre‐1789. The Order that eventually emerged with renewed vigour like a phoe‐
nix from the ashes was a reformed institution, an Order, religious and charitable, as it had 
originally been before being militarised, responding to the powerful ideals, spirit and mood 
of early nineteenth‐century nationalism.3 For the umptieth time, it showed convincingly its 
uniquely remarkable powers of resilience.
Resilience was the Order’s strongest shield—its remarkable ability to recoil fairly quickly into 
its former shape after having experienced a severe crisis. This distinct quality had been cal‐
lously tested on several occasions in its historical evolution—in 1187, the Hospitallers were 
evicted, along with the other military orders, from Jerusalem by Saladin; in 1291, they lost 
Acre to the Mamluks, never to return to the Holy Land; in 1522, they surrendered Rhodes to 
Suleyman the Magnificent and in 1798, French revolutionary forces under Napoleon drove 
them out of Malta. After each of these occasions, the Order succeeded in regaining its former 
state and strength.
Landownership was only one element which lay behind these powers of resilience. The other 
was the patronage the crowned heads of Europe were consistently willing to extend to the 
institution. Statute 2, on the rule governing it,4 makes specific reference to the liberality with 
which the Holy See, the Catholic monarchies, principalities, duchies, republics and devout 
Christians dealt with the Order, enriching it with landed estates, together with a wide range 
of powers, jurisdictions, privileges and exemptions. It was vital for the Hospitallers to culti‐
vate a perfectly healthy relationship with its powerful patrons. This was a reciprocal ‘moral 
code’, for in return the Order offered Europe ‘direct and constant assistance against the ene‐
mies of the Christian faith’.
3. Hospitaller activity in the Mediterranean
The Order of the hospital was a religious‐military institution. Its activities in the Mediterranean 
may be grouped into two large categories, two overwhelming obligations, which corre‐
sponded neatly with its character—charity and war—and which, in an early seventeenth‐
century document, were placed nearly on a par with the three monastic vows which every 
professed Hospitaller took on admission into the Order.5 One was of a widely ‘defensive’ char‐
acter, intended to extend forms of piety and protection, epitomised in its guiding principle of 
hospitality in its widest possible connotation. Inspired by the evangelical concept of ‘love thy 
neighbour’, it was offered to whoever needed any form of caring attention, with no restrictive 
qualifications of age, class, faith, gender, colour or country of origin. The second category was 
3For the Order after the loss of Malta [7].
4See Volume che contiene gli Statuti della Sacra Religione Gerosolimitana; Le Ordinazioni dell’ultimo Capitolo 
Generale…; il Nuovo Cerimoniale prescritto dalla Santità di N. Sig. Papa Urbano VIII sopra l’Elezione de’ Gran Maestri 
….Borgo Nuovo MDCCXIX. Per Antonio Scionico, Stampatore Generale.
5This is discussed in my forthcoming book, Lo Stato dell’Ordine di Malta, 1630.
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combative or ‘offensive’ in nature, always ready to launch an aggressive action. This comprised 
the militia principle or obligation, to wage an incessant war against the enemy of the Cross.
James Reston Jr.’s assertive definition of the state of the Knights Hospitallers after losing Rhodes 
as ‘refugees without portfolio … wondering aimlessly’ [8] is wrong and misleading. In the eight 
long years from 1 January 1523, the Order’s movement from one place to another was partly 
motivated by its strong desire to secure the permanent residence on Malta which Grandmaster 
L’Isle Adam had requested before leaving Crete6 and partly dictated by persistent outbreaks of 
plague. Negotiating the difficult conditions which Charles V had originally decided to attach 
to his enfeoffment of the island was a protracted diplomatic process. These years constituted a 
perilous odyssey indeed, where the homeless institution was exposed to potential dissolution, 
but they were not wasted years. Rather, immediately following the humiliation the Knights suf‐
fered at Rhodes, these years were a true trial of Hospitaller strength, an audaciously bold public 
relations exercise, where their spirit of charity and hospitality, their medical expertise, and par‐
ticipation in corsairing were, as circumstances determined, openly manifested at every stage on 
their tortuous way from Rhodes to Malta via Crete, Sicily, Viterbo, Nice and Villefranche [11]. 
These activities underscored, and were perhaps meant to underscore now more than at any 
other time, the institution’s relevance to the general interests of Christian Europe.
4. Health and hospitality
The Hospitallers’ conventual fortress on Malta, as on Rhodes, militated against two impla‐
cable enemies. Its massive walls surrounding the new city of Valletta and the rest of the Grand 
Harbour, together with its numerous coastal towers, had been allowed to grow into their awe‐
some architectural grandeur not only to defend the island and scare any potential enemy away. 
It was a standing symbol of another traditional scourge. The Mediterranean faced a worse 
threat than either the Crescent or the Cross could offer the opposing half of the great sea—north 
and west and east and south. The plague was more brutal and devastating than the characteris‐
tic violent confrontation between the two, worse than either piracy or slavery in its deadly con‐
sequences, worse than any crusading warfare in its destruction. The Hospitallers approached 
its potential outbreak with unwavering rigour. Their long medical tradition, their knowledge of 
hygiene, their expertise and direct involvement in health management and their inflexibility in 
dealing with quarantine and other related mechanisms endeavoured, though not always suc‐
cessfully7, to keep the plague at a comfortably secure distance, to the extent that their aggres‐
sive severity at times provoked a storm of protest from Venice’s own health authorities [13].
The Grand Hospital which the Knights built on migrating from Birgu to the new city of 
Valletta, and ‘its numerous subsidiary institutions’,8 constituted their first line of defence 
6Grandmaster Philippe Villiers de L’Isle Adam, before leaving Crete, had specifically requested Emperor Charles V 
to grant the Order either Malta or the port city of Brindisi in Southern Italy on the Adriatic coast, offering him to pay 
100,000 ducats for the award [9], and [10].
7Hospitaller Malta experienced severe outbreaks of plague epidemics in 1592–1593, 1623, 1655, and 1675–1676. See [12].
8Ref. [14]. See also Riley‐Smith’s observations in Ref. [2], pp. 278–279.
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against this scourge. The lazaretto, lying on an islet in Marsamxett Harbour, and the quaran‐
tine station on the Valletta quay on the Grand Harbour, offered a wide range of amenities—
accommodation for crews and passengers under observation or in isolation, accommodation 
for animals, stores and warehouses for merchandise, facilities for disinfection and fumigation, 
and a chapel for spiritual needs dedicated to St Roche. These services marked an authentic 
continuity of those that had already been offered to the pilgrims, the sick, the poor and the 
homeless at the conventual hospital four centuries earlier in Jerusalem (see for example [15]). 
It was an unbroken tradition ‘of extensive alms‐giving to the poor, of doctors and surgeons, of 
nightly prayers in the hospital for benefactors and others led by the Order’s priests, of provi‐
sions of orphans and lepers, of maternity wards and of financial support, medicine and diet, 
burial arrangements and the treatment of those wounded in battle’ [15].
These services included, too, ‘a mobile tented hospital that accompanied Christian field 
armies’, singularly rare for the twelfth century [16, 17]. As his predecessors had done in 
Jerusalem, Acre, Limassol on Cyprus and Rhodes, and as he and his successors would do 
again on Malta, Grand Master l’Isle Adam continued, wherever the Order sojourned, to serve 
from his own hands 13 poor persons every morning in honour of Christ and his 12 apos‐
tles, offering bread and wine to the most wretched. The French Secretary to Grand Master 
Gregorio Carafa, Fra Gio. Batta Le Marinier de Cany, remarked in 1670 that these qualities 
formed the quintessence of the true grandeur of the Hospitaller ethos.9 Over the very long 
perspective, the Order’s hospices and hospitals were true centres of selfless commitment and 
dedication to those in need. The difference between the two conventual hospitals in Jerusalem 
and Malta lay solely in policies and practices that reflected the progress made in medical 
knowledge [15, p. 175].
Over 100 years after de Cany, the Order, now economically weakened and reduced to near 
impotence by the revolution in France and with hardly any powerful patron other than the 
papacy, was still loyal to its original principles. In 1930, on the strength of what he defines 
as ‘a vast amount of evidence’, including fruitful eye‐witness accounts of travellers visiting 
Malta in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries [19–21], Frederick Ryan claimed that the 
Order remained ‘faithful to the duties of Hospitality’ to the end of its days in Malta’ [22], and 
that its hospital ‘was well abreast of its time from the scientific point of view’, and that from 
the religious standpoint this great hospital was ably fulfilling, with a multitude of other activi‐
ties in Malta, the great function of a centre for corporal works of mercy’ [22].
From the early origin of their hospice in Jerusalem ‘shortly before 1071’ [23] to their surrender 
of Malta in June 1798, over 700 years had passed. It is remarkable that, during this very long 
term, generation after generation of Hospitallers never failed to understand and positively 
respond as dispensers of charity and hospitality to the needs and condition of the marginalised 
in society and to the ever pressing demands of public health. Irrespective of where their con‐
vent stood, irrespective of the prevailing socio‐economic context of the Mediterranean world 
and irrespective of the state of their priories throughout Christian Europe, the Hospitallers’ 
9National Library of Malta, Archives of the Order of Malta, Codex 1697: Riflessioni di un Cavaliere di Malta, Religioso 
dell’Ordine Militare degli Ospedalieri di S. Giovanni di Gerusalemme, sopra la grandezza e i doveri del suo stato, 1670. 
See also Ref. [18].
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main concern was ultimately the preservation of humanity. The dynamic driving force behind 
this ancient and unbroken tradition was their unwavering concern for the common good. As 
pointed out elsewhere [13, p. 204], men occupied the centre stage of their charitable activities.
5. Hospitaller crusading warfare
Within decades of the fall of Acre to the Mamluks in 1291, the Templars ceased to exist and 
the Teutonic Knights shifted their focus to north‐eastern Europe. The Knights Hospitaller 
was the only Order for whom crusading warfare in the eastern Mediterranean retained its 
original appeal and enthusiasm. They continued to operate from their conventual base first 
on Cyprus, then on Rhodes and from 1530 from nearer Western Europe on Malta. Their 
direct and persistent involvement in holy warfare prolonged the life of the crusade to the 
end of the eighteenth century. Organising and participating in holy warfare justified the 
Order’s retention of its western priories and commanderies [2, p. 334]. This early‐modern 
form of the crusade was distinct from the old, medieval one associated with Jerusalem. Its 
objectives were different: the Holy Land was gone and gone forever; no vows, temporal or 
spiritual privileges, no plenary indulgences or remission of sins and no papal sponsorship 
appear to have been attached to it; no age restrictions were imposed; no physical fitness 
or material wealth were demanded. This post‐Acre role was in harmony with the normal 
expectations of a dynamic religious‐military institution, whose raison d’être after all was 
to pray, help and fight. It was an uninterrupted continuation of the Order’s old practices, 
methods and beliefs.
On Malta, more perhaps than on Rhodes, Europe was converted into a new ‘holy land’ for the 
Hospitallers to defend against Islam. On the central Mediterranean island, as on Dodecanese 
Rhodes, the Order’s military role assumed four distinct forms [24]. It participated in practi‐
cally all the holy leagues, like that formed by Paul III in 1538 or by Pius V in May 1571, placing 
all its naval forces at the disposal of the allied Christian fleets.
On other occasions, it contributed its entire galley squadron and other craft to the Habsburgs’ 
punitive campaigns against the infidel. To instance one classic example: in preparation for 
Charles V’s large‐scale expedition to regain Tunis, which Khaireddin Barbarossa had seized 
in 1534, exposing the southern coasts of Spain, Italy and Sicily to Muslim attack [25], the 
Order first secured the necessary supplies of food from Sicily and then had its galley squad‐
ron strengthened, raising it from four to five by launching the Santa Caterina in mid‐April 
1535. The sixth was under construction. To the four Hospitaller galleys, 200 Knights were 
assigned [26]. On board the caracca Sant’Anna, which accompanied the Hospitaller squadron, 
there were another 70 Knights and a strong regiment of soldiers [26]. By the end of June 
1535, the allied fleet, not without great difficulty [8; pp. 366–338], took the fortress of La 
Goletta. By 21st July, the fortress and city of Tunis were both in Christian hands. That gave 
the Habsburgs complete control over the entry into the western Mediterranean from the east. 
The only criticism of this great achievement was that Charles V failed to follow the logic dic‐
tated by geopolitics—to follow up that victory by an immediate assault on Algiers. That came 
6 years later and ended up in disaster.
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The list of similar collective enterprises can be stretched indefinitely. From Tunis to Lepanto, 
the role played by the Hospitallers pursued a predictably regular pattern of participation 
in nearly all the activities of the allied Christian fleet. Its four‐galley squadron was pres‐
ent at Corfu (1537) [25; iii: pp. 425–427, 26; iii: pp. 170–172], Prevesa (1538),10 Otranto and 
Castelnuovo in Dalmatia (1539) [25; iii: p. 446, 26; iii: pp. 186–187], and the waters of Taranto 
(1540) [26; iii: pp. 186–187]. That same year, too, the Order, allied to the Sicilian forces, took 
part in the conquest of Monastir and Susa [26, p. 194] and in the unsuccessful siege of Sfax 
[26; pp. 194–195]. The next year Charles V decided to repeat at Algiers what he had achieved 
at Tunis six years before [26; pp. 199–200, 205–211]. The allied forces reached Algiers towards 
the end of October. When the fall of the fortress was about to be secured, the ‘natural ele‐
ments’ intervened in favour of the besieged. ‘The besiegers’, observed Mori Ubaldini, ‘were 
immobilised for three whole days by a violent storm with torrential rains and raging winds’ 
[30]. Giacomo Bosio, the great historian of the Order, draws a very dramatically detailed 
portrait of the situation on the morning of 28 October [26, iii: p. 208]. In 1550, the Hospitallers 
found themselves once more engaged in the allied campaign against the port town of 
Mahdiya (today a Tunisian coastal city, south of Monastir and southeast of Sousse) [26; pp. 
243, 257–258, 266–267, 27; p. 910, 31], and in 1564, they participated in the conquest of Peñón 
de Velez [32].
So much has been written on the Ottoman siege of Malta (1565) and on the battle of Lepanto 
(1571) that they hardly need any further remarks here, but their historical significance will be 
brought up towards the end of the present chapter. After the siege of Cyprus and Lepanto, 
the Order continued to respond equally positively to requests for help from the Republic of 
Venice. The long‐drawn‐out Venetian wars first at Crete (1645–1669) and then twice at the 
Morea, towards the end of seventeenth century and the second decade of the eighteenth cen‐
tury. The Order could hardly decline requests to contribute to either of these two types of for‐
mal anti‐Muslim war. Invitations emanating from the papacy, the Order’s ultimate authority, 
were synonymous with instructions. They could not be turned down unless for a very serious 
reason. Neither could it dismiss with any modicum of comfort requests from the powerful 
Spanish monarchy, its feudal lord.
The intervals between one formal war and another, between one Holy League or Habsburg 
campaign (which were hardly distinguishable) and another, gave the Order some respite to 
accommodate its statutory provisions, ambitions and aspirations, to live up to its naval and 
military tradition. This was the third form of Hospitaller crusading activity when it could 
design its own priorities and organise similar expeditions on a less spectacular scale in all 
parts of the Mediterranean. The objective of such ventures on seasonal crusading cruises was 
to harass Muslims on land and by sea, ravage their coastal towns and villages, harass Muslim 
merchants, raid their shipping, seize their merchandise and carry their men, women and chil‐
dren into slavery [33, 34].
The corso was the fourth genre of Hospitaller warfare. The initial involvement of indi‐
vidual member of the Order in formal anti‐Muslim corsairing activity has been assigned to 
10Refs. [25; iii: pp. 445–447 and n. 208, 26; iii: pp. 178–180], ‘Prevesa gave Islam that control of the sea of which the Chris‐
tian victory at Lepanto was to deprive it in 1571’ [27–29].
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the first years of Spain’s Siglo de Oro [30; p. 108], when individual Hospitaller was autho‐
rised, like other ordinary privateers, to set out on their own on what may be termed a 
private crusade. On 25th November 1503, for example, the Knight Ynyogo Ayalla was 
licensed to arm the Order’s barcia Santa Maria and sail out on a privateering expedition in 
Levantine waters on condition that two‐thirds of his booty would go to the Order’s com‐
mon treasury. The event coincided with Spain’s Reconquista, whose unintended repercus‐
sions delivered the birth of the Barbary regencies and dramatically widened the scope 
for the ruthless excesses of the pirates of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and, after 1551, Tripoli, 
spreading their activities over a vastly grander scale, and extended the Ottoman Empire’s 
sphere of direct influence all along the Maghribi coast. The Barbary corsairs’ activities in 
the Mediterranean, the sense of insecurity they created, and the general threat they offered 
to Christian trade proved beneficial to the Order as they highlighted the Hospitaller’s 
political relevance in the region, providing tangible evidence in support of their claimed 
indispensability [32; pp. 388–397, 35–37].
These years indicated the first stages in the Mediterranean’s gradual loss of the primacy it had 
long been enjoying in global economy [38, 39]. Hospitaller privateering, under the guise of 
crusading activity and covered by the magistral emblem or the Order’s eight‐pointed cross, 
eventually escalated into an endemic warfare, reaching spectacular peaks in the next cen‐
tury. These colourful exploits against Islam undertaken both by individual members of the 
Hospital and by a wide section of the native population were reconfirmed when the Order 
moved from Rhodes to the central Mediterranean and encouraged to develop into a major 
industry on Malta. Indeed, the island itself was transformed into a thriving corsair base with 
a flourishing international slave market. No wonder the Venetian Senate in the late 1580s 
dubbed the Hospitallers ‘corsairs parading crosses’ [40], who fostered a culture of piracy, 
ransom and plunder.
6. ‘Coexistence and symbiosis’
In history, long‐held assumptions often need to be revisited. In Venetians in Constantinople, Eric 
Dursteler argues how thin the distinction was between word and action, between rhetoric and 
reality, how ‘porous’ and ‘pliable’, the borderline or frontiers were between the two in matters 
of faith and geopolitics in the early modern Mediterranean world. Within the broad frame‐
work of the ideological chasm between Christianity and Islam not only were ‘coexistence and 
symbiosis’ possible; they were ‘almost certainly the quotidian norm rather than the excep‐
tion’. He questions the historical validity of the traditional reconstruction of these two power‐
fully determining forces as being in perpetual engagement ‘in a life‐and‐death struggle’ [41]. 
The relationship between Venice and Constantinople provides a perfect example. They can‐
not be defined as two friendly empires by whatever criterion is adopted. They were declared 
enemies. They fought several wars against each other. But when times ‘were not distorted by 
hostility’ [41; p. 20], their relationship was marked by ‘interaction and coexistence’ [41; p. 19]. 
This state of living in near harmony despite different ideologies and interests marked almost 
the entire history of the Republic.
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It has now been claimed that the Hospitaller regime on Rhodes too adopted such sensible and 
realistic approach towards the Ottomans and the Mamluks, one based on practical rather than 
on theoretical consideration [42]. Unlike what we have hitherto believed, the inflexibility of 
the Order’s stance towards Islam was more apparent than real. Geography, the weather, war 
and the overall political atmosphere prevailing throughout the eastern Mediterranean at the 
heart of which lay the island order‐state11 [32, 33] of Rhodes dictated an unavoidable form of 
‘interaction and coexistence’ with its otherwise hostile neighbourly Muslim powers. The gen‐
eral perception entertained of the institution’s unwavering militant opposition to Islam was 
of the Order’s own creation. It was the intended outcome of its profession of its mission and 
propagated through the wide network of its experienced diplomatic representatives in Europe 
for the consumption of its Christian patrons in the West. There is no doubt, of course, that the 
Hospitallers were sworn enemies of Islam. But concealed underneath the art of Renaissance 
rhetoric stood another Order. The fifteenth‐century picture that emerges of the hospital from 
its surviving chancery records does not in fact correspond very neatly to this traditional inter‐
pretation [42; pp. 109–119]. The reality of this other phase of the institution uttered a different 
dialect. The brutal truth, we are told, is that ‘safe‐conducts, licenses to arm ships and licenses 
to trade tell of the peaceful passage of Turkish merchants and diplomats through the Port of 
Rhodes. The Master of the Order licensed trade with Muslim ports in Syria and Egypt and 
enacted treaties with Muslim powers, with or without papal consent’[42; p. 110].
Rhodes ruling regime, it has been pointed out, ‘could not afford to alienate the Ottomans 
completely because Constantinople was an important grain source for the region. Likewise 
the Hospitallers maintained diplomatic relations with the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt because 
Rhodes and Alexandria were trading partners’ [42; p. 116].
The pragmatism of Hospitaller policies is still under‐researched. It needs to be scrutinised fur‐
ther, more deeply, over a longer timeframe, and on a much wider spatial scale. Was the Order 
on Malta as pragmatic in its attitude towards the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim powers 
on North Africa as it had been on Rhodes? If so, such interaction must have been much more 
subtle and refined. Archival documentation does indicate a few isolated cases of apparently 
similar practices during its Maltese phase, but these were carried out through the mediation or 
intervention of French agencies, exchanges under cover of the French flag. In 1754, for exam‐
ple, severely strained relations between the Order and the Kingdom of Naples resulted in the 
suspension of Malta’s trade links with that Kingdom. To counter the effects of the embargo, 
11According to Luttrell’s definition, the island order‐state of Rhodes ‘demanded the establishment of a naval tradition 
and the arrangement of the local economy and government in ways which would support defensive measures. The 
harbour brought shipping, pilgrims, pirates, trade, and taxes; the island was populated to produce foodstuffs and auxil‐
iary forces; its forests furnished timber for shipbuilding; the inhabitants constructed and manned towers and castles or 
served as galley oarsmen’ [2. pp. 334–335]. Most of these attributes applied equally well to Hospitaller Malta. Like the 
Greeks on Rhodes, the Maltese too were ‘reasonably fed, protected… on the whole the population felt reasonably well 
treated and was prepared to collaborate’ [2. pp. 334–335]. The central Mediterranean island‐fortress offered all captains 
of vessels sailing the Mediterranean, all sailors, passengers and merchants of Christian States access to a strongly forti‐
fied, fully equipped base for all forms of operations, a safe neutral port of call, an arsenal, a lazaretto with other quaran‐
tine facilities, an efficient hospital, a flourishing market, spacious warehouses, courts of justice and consular assistance. 
They produced ashes and cultivated cumin and cotton for export. These attractive conditions explain why very few riots 
or protests occurred over 268 years of Hospitaller rule [43, 44]. See also the resident Venetian Minister’s comments on the 
so‐called ‘uprising of the priests’ in Ref. [45].
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Grand Master Emanuel Pinto’s Uditore sought the help of the French consul in Tunis to provide 
the order‐state with some 5,000 heads of cattle and other livestock.12 Another example concerns 
Hospitaller Malta’s relations with Morocco in the 1760s [45; Letter CCVI, p. 596, n. 496].
The geographical proximity of central Mediterranean Malta to Europe, especially to the 
papacy, probably placed the Order under closer observation than it could have possibly been 
in the south‐east Aegean. The inquisitor resided on the island to combat heresy; from 1575 
he assumed too the function of a nuncio or apostolic delegate. His double surveillance role 
could not have been too enticing or comforting for the Hospitaller regime. His regular cor‐
respondence with the Secretariat of State at the Vatican shows a much wider interest than the 
eradication of heresy. And along with the nuncio, there were several other resident ministers 
and consuls representing the interests of various European royal courts on the island. France, 
for example, had her Homme du Roi; Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, Tuscany, the tiny principality of 
Monaco and others: each had their own minister or chargé d’affaires. From the mid‐eighteenth 
century, Venice had her Uomo della Repubblica in the person of Massimiliano Buzzaccarini 
Gonzaga. Each corresponded regularly with his sending state to report, at times in minute 
detail [46], on what was going on in and around Malta. As late as 1770, for example, dur‐
ing the Russo‐Turkish war of 1768–1774, the Venetian Minister received a note from Venice’s 
Magistracy of Trade saying that it would be greatly appreciated if he continued to keep the 
Senate abreast of developments in the central Mediterranean.13 Though himself a high‐rank‐
ing member of the Hospital, like all the other similar representatives on the island except the 
nuncio [47], there were moments when the Venetian minister was quite critical both of Grand 
Master Emanuel Pinto’s style and method of government [45; pp. 77–78] and of Benedict XIV 
[45; p. 79]. It is also interesting to observe, and quite revealing and enlightening, that no such 
foreign representation existed on Hospitaller Rhodes,14 which goes some way to make the 
Order’s stance there perhaps more understandable. There was a Venetian consulate for a while 
but was discontinued in about 1410 on the grounds that other nations wanted consuls as well.15
7. The siege of Malta and the Battle of Lepanto
Within the context of what Samuel P. Huntington has defined as the ‘clash of civilisations’ 
[48], the epic siege of Malta (1565) and the large naval Battle of Lepanto (1571) were the two 
most outstanding events in the history of the early‐modern Mediterranean. In both, the 
Hospitallers were involved directly: in the first, they were the leading protagonists; in the 
second, they participated in Pius V’s Holy League with three fully equipped galleys and 
12National Library of Malta, Archives of the Order, codex 1511: The two letters, each dated 11 March 1754, addressed to 
the French consul Plowman in Tunis.
13The note, addressed too to various Venetian consuls, said: ‘[Il Senato] trova opportuno e necessario di aver da voi una 
regolare anticipata cognizione di tutte le cose che vanno succedendo a codesta parte’ [45; Letter CXXXIX, p. 449, n. 355].
14I thank Dr Anthony Luttrell, Professor Juergen Sarnowsky and Professor Helen J. Nicholson for this observation. 
Emailed communications, 13, 16 March 2017.
15Dr Anthony Luttrell, in a private communication, 13 March 2017.
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manned with experienced Knights and soldiers along with the allied forces of Spain, Venice, 
the papacy and other Italian principalities [30; p. 270]. In 1565, the small, weakly fortified 
island, exposed and vulnerable, succeeded in withstanding, for four whole months, a furious 
assault unleashed by Suleyman’s mighty armada. In 1571, the fragile Holy League destroyed 
nearly the entire Ottoman naval forces. News of both developments, at merely six years apart, 
spread all over Christian Europe like wild fire, followed by widespread rejoicing and celebra‐
tions on a grand scale and commemorated by contemporaries and later generations in various 
shapes and forms—in eyewitnesses’ accounts, in literature, on canvas, in music, in archival 
records. But euphoria of victory and jubilation do not recast near‐permanent structures.
Historians have tended to identify the outcome of both events as a determining stage in the 
gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire. Halil Inalcik claims that the withdrawal of Suleyman’s 
forces from Malta in September 1565 ‘marked the beginning of a halt in the Ottoman advance 
into … the Mediterranean’ [28; p. 41]. Colin Imber assigns ‘the end of the Ottoman maritime 
expansion towards the west’ to the conquest of Chios, the Genoese island in the Aegean, in 
1566 [49]. Thomas Dandelet asserts that Lepanto ‘signalled the end of Ottoman expansion 
beyond Crete’ [50]. This historiographical discourse casts grey clouds over the reality, some‐
how obscuring the skyline. It should be discreetly relegated to the mythical spheres of the 
past where it comfortably belongs. The true significance of both events lies elsewhere.
The outcome of the siege greatly enhanced Philip II’s ‘imperial reputation … because it 
revealed him to be living up to the old … humanistic programme of reviving ancient Roman 
military power to crush the Ottoman threat’ [50; p. 153]. It was to him that the Order, Malta 
and the central Mediterranean owed an enormous deal. His timely Spanish intervention had 
‘saved [them] from the Turks’ [51]. On landing on the island, the relief force of some 10,000 
men instantly scared the enemy away without even engaging it in battle.
Within the narrow sphere of Hospitaller and Maltese history, the siege helped the Hospitallers 
to survive and retain their Convent firmly in the central Mediterranean. It revamped their 
political relevance to Christian Europe much more than Tunis had done three decades earlier, 
and reconfirmed their institution’s traditional role as a force of continuity. The siege also trans‐
formed their island order‐state into an almost unrecognisable form, turned it into a formidable 
fortress, and ushered it into the forefront of Mediterranean politics and the modern world. It 
may well have set the Ottoman naval expansionism temporarily back, but failed to reverse the 
Turk’s dominance in the Middle Sea. It simply defined his Empire’s ‘geographical limits’ [52].
On the other hand, the Battle of Lepanto was not a collective effort to eliminate Christian 
Europe’s common enemy as it has often been depicted. Venice depended so much on the 
empire for its trade. Judged from its short‐term result, it was an implicitly professed recon‐
firmation of the major Latin protagonists that their own interests held pride of place in their 
scale of values. At Lepanto, the bitterly divided Christian West, allied in a tenuous holy alli‐
ance, confronted Islam through extreme, inbred religious fanaticism, a pervasive spirit of raw 
intolerance and a hysterical ideology of hatred of ‘the other’, so evident in the rejoicing and 
jubilation celebrating the horrors and atrocities of the battle. These were the ingredients which 
formed the texture of contemporary life in the sixteenth‐century Mediterranean.
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The Ottomans failed to realise their objective in 1565 and were defeated in 1571. 
Notwithstanding both disasters, they took the Venetian island of Cyprus, ‘the greatest feat 
of Ottoman arms’ [28; p. 41]. They defended their new acquisition with a newly built armada 
that within a few months had replaced the one destroyed at Lepanto [28, p. 41]. The new fleet, 
reflecting the innovative technological evolution [53], consisted of bigger vessels, including 
eight galeasses, larger than the Venetian ones and fully armed, apart from other galleys and 
smaller craft ([54] also in Ref. [55]). Its recovery and the perception of that extraordinary dyna‐
mism helped it retain the new acquisition and dictated Venice’s ‘betrayal’ of the Holy League 
and the latter’s dissolution.
Neither of the two events, nor their collective impact, succeeded in destroying the Ottomans’ 
naval power. Ottoman ‘presence in the Levant and North Africa’ survived and remained 
as threateningly ‘real and dreadful’ as before [56]. ‘The years after 1571 still gave enough 
evidence of the aggressive power of the Turks at sea and on land’ [56; p. 203]. In 1573, they 
ravaged the coasts of Southern Italy and Sicily. They occupied La Goletta and permanently 
seized the fortress of Tunis in September 1574, with which they recovered their ‘self‐respect’ 
[27; p. 1139]. In 1576, they raided Palermo and captured Fez in Morocco [57]. In 1588, they 
harassed ‘Valencia and its surroundings’. ‘The shores of Calabria and Sicily’, points out 
Alexander De Groot, ‘were raided in 1592, 1593, and 1594 by the corsair galleys from Bizerta 
… and the main Ottoman fleet … with 90–120 galleys’. In the last few years of the century 
and the beginning of the next, Naples and Sicily experienced similar aggressive pressure. 
‘The main fleet passed Malta and Gozo on its way to and from Algiers in 1598’ [56; pp. 
215–216]. In the seventeenth century, the Turks took the Venetian island of Crete and early in 
the eighteenth century they again confronted the Venetians in the Morea. ‘The peace made 
at Passarowitz in 1718 confirmed the naval superiority of the Ottomans over the Venetians’ 
[56; p. 230]. Drawing his data from Giuseppe Bonaffini’s La Sicilia e i Barbereschi [58], Thomas 
James Dandelet claims that between 1570 and 1606, ‘Sicily alone was attacked 136 times’ [50; 
p. 152]. Not only were the Ottomans reconfirmed masters of the eastern Mediterranean, a 
dominance they had established since 1538 at Prevesa; they even strengthened ‘their hold 
upon the Maghreb’ [59]. That was Lepanto’s legacy. Voltaire was not far from the truth when 
he claimed that ‘the victory of Lepanto seemed rather to have been on the side of the Turks’ 
[60]. Alexander De Groot argues that the term Ottoman decline ‘is devoid of any real meaning’ 
[56; p. 253].
My position on this issue does not diminish the importance of either event by one iota. Both 
the siege and the battle had indeed been stunning victories for the Christian West; both were 
extremely injurious to the dignity and pride of the Ottoman Empire. But humiliation is a 
psychological condition, an obvious discomfiture that was however fairly quickly overcome. 
The two events were strategically inconsequential in the long‐term perspective of historical 
development, both of the Ottoman Empire and of the Mediterranean. The spirit of ideological 
confrontation which had inspired them both and, indeed, similar other occasions before and 
after them, did not disappear; nor did the prevailing mood grow fainter. The status quo in the 
Mediterranean was reconfirmed. ‘The cultural shape of the lands around the Mediterranean’ 
writes Gregory Melleuish, survived unimpaired, ‘with a largely Islamic East and South star‐
ing across the waters at a Christian North and West’ [53].
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8. Conclusion
The idea of the decline of the Mediterranean needs revisiting and redefining. Did the great dis‐
coveries, to which it is generally attributed, convert the sea into an isolated backwater, perhaps 
tranquil and undisturbed? Did the ‘great sea’ shrink into insignificance as a result? Was its unity, its 
internal coherence [27; p. 14], shattered? From the evidence to date, it would appear that the decline 
was only partial: the Middle Sea was deprived only of the primacy it had been for long enjoying in 
global economy and international exchange. But was economic pre‐eminence, however central and 
determining, the only feature that had constituted the sea’s true greatness? Today the validity of 
the claim of ‘the economic decline of the eastern Mediterranean’ has been questioned [61].
After 1492, the Mediterranean still retained the natural distinct elements of cultural unity that 
had been so intimately characteristic of it. The homogeneity of its climate [27; pp. 234–238] 
remained unaltered. Its winter temperatures did not grow colder with the ‘massive invasion’ 
of the Northerners from the 1580s. Nor did the latter turn its often fiercely hot summer months 
into a pleasantly mild season. The sea kept its ‘blue transparency’. The cultivation of the vine, 
the olive tree and the palm tree does not appear to have been diminished or discontinued. The 
Mediterranean still held on to its ‘relatively easy navigability’ [62] and ‘maritime interconnect‐
edness’ it enjoyed since ancient times [63]. The peoples inhabiting its ancient world still nour‐
ished their natural inclination and attitude towards the sea long after Christopher Columbus 
had crossed the Atlantic. Fishing, pastoralism and farming remained constant features of local 
economies through the entire region. Plague and other deadly diseases were also shared expe‐
riences. Inhabitants from each of the four corners of the Mediterranean who survived such 
characteristic catastrophes had frightening stories to narrate about these phenomena [64]. 
Piracy, corsairing and slavery, on either side of the ideological fence, remained vigorous activ‐
ities that marked everyday life. And the open clash of religion between Christianity and Islam 
did not diminish in its intensity with the enormous structural changes that followed 1492—the 
great voyages to the New World, the discovery of the new route to the East round the Cape of 
Good Hope, the fall of Granada, the expulsion of the Jews from the Iberian peninsula and the 
massive migrations of exiled peoples that these changes set in motion [65], the sudden conver‐
sion of the brilliance of Renaissance Italy into a savage theatre of war between Habsburg Spain 
and Valois France, and the steady spread of Lutheranism.
One other relevant observation. Notwithstanding its loss of economic primacy in the world, the 
sixteenth‐century Mediterranean retained its explosive civilising power and remained as inspir‐
ing as ever before. By the time the Order was about to settle on Malta, ‘the curtain,’ we are told 
[27; p. 828], had already fallen ‘on the splendours of the Renaissance’. It soon became the cradle 
of the volcanic eruption of the ‘sprawling and extravagant’ Baroque [27; p.827]. From afflu‐
ent Italy, it flourished rapidly for centuries, with the Spanish galleons carrying it to the newly 
discovered lands across the Atlantic. ‘The Mediterranean,’ asserts Braudel, ‘was the donor, 
the transmitter and therefore a superior power, whose teachings, way of life and tastes were 
adopted in lands far from its shores’ [27; p. 829]. The Baroque, an expression of the vitality of 
Italian society, demonstrated that Italy, at the core of the Mediterranean, had once more trans‐
formed itself into a ‘competitive and predominant’ civilising force, whose dynamic influence 
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‘spread to cover almost all of Europe, the Catholic and indirectly the Protestant as well: curious 
evidence of the unity of a world divided’ [66]. Whether this civilising overflow of exuberance, 
which ushered in a new age, was indeed ‘a sign of … economic failure’ [27; p. 900] is debatable.
W. V. Harris draws up a list of other ‘essential elements’ which should be reconsidered [62; 
pp. 11–20]. The unchangeableness, or ‘immobility’ as he calls it [62; pp. 9–10], of certain 
Mediterranean attributes can be seen, by way of a tiny isolated illustration drawn from the 
island of Malta. Today, the colourful Maltese luzzu (or fishing boat) still sails elegantly in and 
out of Marsamxett harbour in the south of Malta, and several fishermen still cast their nets in 
the blue Mediterranean and have them spread out on the quay to dry, to mend, to have them 
cleared of weeds, much as their ancestors had done hundreds of years before them. The majes‐
tic Dingle Cliffs, over 250 meters above sea level, on the island’s western coast, have hardly 
changed from prehistoric times, except perhaps as a result of natural erosion. These are classic 
symptoms of Braudelian timelessness: ‘permanent’, ‘unchanging’ and ‘motionless’ features, 
the ‘constants’ of the past. But Malta may perhaps be too small an island to demonstrate con‐
vincingly the vast recurring realities of the Mediterranean with an estimated total population 
ranging from 68 to 92 million between 1600 and 1800 [61; pp. 100–101]. An indefinite host of 
similar instances can be safely, and perhaps more convincingly, sought at Sicilian and south‐
ern Italian ports, in southern France and Spain, along the Adriatic, and on Greek islands.
Within this context of near‐permanent structures, life did not stand still. The Mediterranean 
region would have stagnated, it would have been transformed into another ‘dead sea’, had 
there been no change at all. Life in the Mediterranean changed, for, after all, is not change the 
quintessence of history? But change and decline are not synonymous concepts. Only a persis‐
tent process of change for the worse over the long perspective can define the idea of decline 
accurately. In the midst of this historical process of change, there are always opposing forces of 
resistance, of continuity: they confront and delay the whole process of restructuring, conver‐
sion, or indeed decline and therefore slow down the whole course of development for better 
or for worse. The Hospitaller Order of St John had been one such living force. In its dynamism, 
and its traditional operations first from Rhodes and then from Malta, it helped preserve, as has 
been shown above, some of the basic features of early modern Mediterranean culture, lifestyle 
and society. When Buzzaccarini Gonzaga had first set foot on Malta as Venice’s first resident 
minister to the Grand Master’s court in the early 1750s, he observed that the island order‐state 
was playing a vital role for the entire Christendom. Shortly before he passed away in 1776, he 
was still convinced that the Order was performing its mission in protecting Europe against the 
enemy of the Christian faith consistently and admirably [46, passim]. Despite this strong ele‐
ment of continuity, the Hospitaller institution, points out Anthony Luttrell, ‘did not embody a 
decayed medieval ideal being lived out in a state of terminal anachronism’ [2; p. 355].
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